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Abstract
In resource based economies, regulating the production and export activities have always
been an important challenge. Examples in oil and gas show that different behaviors have
been adopted ranging from the export monopoly to the complete opening of the export
market. This paper tries to explain this multitude of solutions via strategic interactions.
When modeling imperfect competition, players are separated in two categories: those who
exert market power and those who are competitive and propose the good at their marginal
supply cost. Letting a player freely choose whether it wants to exert market power or
not when it optimizes its utility is not discussed in the literature. This paper addresses
this issue by letting the players choose the level of competition they want to exert in the
market. To do so, we analyze the behavior of two countries competing to supply a market
with a homogeneous good in an imperfect competition setting. Each country decides the
number of firms it authorizes to sell in the market. The interaction between the firms is of
a Nash-Cournot type, where each one exerts market power and is in competition with all
other firms allowed to sell, whether they belong to the same country or not. Each country
optimizes its utility, that is the sum of the profits of its firms. We have studied four kinds
of interaction between the countries. The first calculates the closed loop Nash equilibrium
of the game between the countries. The second setup analyzes the cartel when the countries
collude. The third focuses on the open loop Nash equilibrium and the fourth models a
bi-level Stackelberg interaction where one country plays before the other. We demonstrate
that in the closed loop Nash equilibrium, our setting leads to the prisoner’s dilemma: the
equilibrium occurs when both countries authorize all their firms to sell in the market. In
other words, countries willingly chose not to exert market power. This result is at first sight
similar to the Allaz & Vila (1993) result but is driven by a completely different economic
reasoning. In the Stackelberg and coordinated solutions, the market is on the contrary very
concentrated and the countries strongly reduce the number of firms that enter the market
in order to fully exert market power and increase the price. The open loop result lies in
between: the countries let all their firms sell but market power remains strong. These results
suggest that the prisoner’s dilemma outcome is due to the conjectural inconsistency of the
Nash equilibrium. Finally, in the Stackelberg setting, we give countries the choice of being
leader or follower and demonstrate that the counter-intuitive competitive outcome is very
unlikely to occur in the market.
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1 Introduction
In a resource based industry, the regulation of exports is crucial. Most oil or gas producing
countries, like Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates or Russia, export via regulated monop-
olies. Other countries, like Norway and Canada, have decided to open their export activity
to competition. In these countries, many firms can produce oil and directly export it to in-
ternational spot markets where they are in competition. Some oil producing countries have
recently experienced an economic shift toward export nationalization: The government of
Argentina decided in 2012 to expropriate Repsol YPF and acquired more than 51% of the
company. Other countries have carried out a shift in the other direction. As an example,
Norway and the United Kingdom have increased competition in the production and export
activity in the previous decades.
From the producing country’s point of view, deciding the level of competition among its
exporting firms ends up to arbitraging between price and volume. If market power is exerted
by the exporters, increasing the number of exporting firms reduces the price, but increases
the total sale of the country. The impact on the total payoff is not obvious and clearly
depends on the number of exporters from the other producing countries and their strate-
gic decisions. In an imperfect competition context, it is not straightforward that an export
monopoly is optimal for a country. The intuition behind this assertion is the possibility of
the other producers to free-ride: if country A is an export monopoly, country B can increase
its export competition to a certain extent, in order to exploit a high price situation created
by country A. Therefore, country A might not be willing to remain an export monopoly
and might want to increase its sales too. These arguments pave the way to the use of the
non-cooperative game theory to treat the subject.
As explained above, the oil industry provides many examples of different behaviors of
the producing countries in the selling activity in terms of market concentration. The gas
industry is another interesting field: as an example, Russia only authorizes Gazporm Export
to sell gas to Europe. Algeria does the same with Sonatrach. On the contrary, Norway
has opened its export market to firms other than Statoil. The main objective of this paper
is to analyze the economic incentives that can lead a country to open or close its pro-
duction/commercialization activity to different firms, at the risk of potentially reducing its
market power exercise. Our analysis will focus on strategic interactions between different
players and will study the robustness of the results with respect to the upstream cost struc-
ture.
Generally, analyzing the means to exert market power when competition is imperfect is
tricky. In competitive markets, prices are the only instruments set by the participants that
intervene in the market (whether they are competitive or distorted by different interventions).
On the contrary, market power can be exerted using different instruments: prices, volumes,
quality of the good, entry barriers, antisymmetric information, etc. Furthermore, the inter-
action between the strategic players can occur in single or multiple stages. Another difficulty
arises with the possibility of some players anticipating the reaction function of other players,
as is the case in the standard Stackelberg model. Therefore,the economic theory dedicated to
imperfect competition (like the monopoly or oligopoly theory) is more concerned about the
concepts of market power exercise and its instruments than the functioning of the markets
themselves.
In energy economics Cournot models are widely used to mimic imperfect competition.
For oil markets, Nash cournot models have been developed to analyze market power since
the seventies. In oil markets, Salant (1976) proposed one of the first Cournot models that
captures market power and the exhaustibility of the resource. In natural gas where the
concentration of the supply justifies the possible exercise of market power, recent Cournot
related works include the World Trade Gas Model of the Rice university (2004), Perner &
Seeliger (2004), Lise & Hobbs (2008), Gabriel, Kiet & Zhuang (2005), Gabriel & Kiet (2005),
Egging, Holz & Gabriel (2010) and Abada et al. (2013). Furthermore, power and coal mar-
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kets models have also seen a growth in the use of Cournot approaches. As an example, one
can cite Neuhoff et al. (2005) (for electricity) and Haftendorn & Holz (2010) (for coal). We
refer to Huppmann (2013) for a detailed description of recent Cournot based energy models
and their differences. The common feature between all these models is that the Cournot
players (also called strategic, those who exert market power), and the competitive players
(those who do not exert market power), are perfectly identified and their behavior is mod-
eled accordingly. In other words, a player is a priori identified as being a Cournot or a
competitive player1. Therefore, the players cannot choose, as a strategic decision, the level
of competition they want to exert in the market, i.e. whether they want to be competitive
or Cournot players. This is mainly due to the fact that the common belief is that if a market
actor has the possibility to exert market power, he will do so because this would increase his
payoff. This reasoning is obviously true in the case of a monopolist. However as explained
above, when it comes to the oligopoly case, this conclusion is not straightforward, since any
volume withholding in the aim to increase the price, can be compensated by some opponents
who might see their payoffs increase accordingly.
Outside the energy domain there is a great amount of literature dedicated to the ques-
tion of optimal behavior of a firm in a market. Singh & Vives (1984), analyze whether profit
maximizing firms should set prices or quantities when competing and find that when goods
are substitutes, firms should set volumes rather than prices (and vice versa if goods are com-
plements). In Hamilton & Slutsky (1990), the authors analyze whether firms should play
simultaneously or sequentially and conclude that if goods are substitutes, the firms should
play simultaneously (and vice-versa is goods are complements). Other works examine the
question from the angle of capacity constraints: Davidson & Deneckere (1986), Shubik &
Levitan (1980) and Osborne & Pitchik (1986). When volume constraints are present, firms
should better compete a la Cournot (quantity setting). On the contrary, without capacity
constraints a Bertrand (price setting) competition is more likely to happen.
Using the Cournot approach to mimic imperfect competition has raised a certain number
of controversies: In a seminal article, Ulph & Folie (1980) studies an oligopoly interacting
with a competitive fringe in a Cournot and a Stackelberg settings. They draw to the counter-
intuitive conclusion that in the Cournot situation, a firm earns more when it stops exerting
market power and becomes competitive (i.e. offers its quantity at its marginal supply cost).
This occurs because a Cournot player does not anticipate the fact that the fringe will replace
part of the volume he withholds to try to force the price up.
Another important criticism addressed to the Cournot equilibrium is that it leads to in-
consistent results with respect to the anticipation of the reaction functions by the players.
In a standard Cournot setting, the reaction function of a player is calculated by assuming
that the opponents have a constant supply and will not react to his actions. However, at
the equilibrium, such a situation does not hold. Consistent Conjectures Equilibria (CCE)
have been introduced to correct this feature (see Bresnahan (1981) and Perry (1982) for
instance). These equilibria have been criticized in return: in Makowski (1987) and Lindh
(1992), the authors argue that at the equilibrium, no player can actually know its rivals’
reaction functions since by definition, at the equilibrium, no deviation is supposed to occur.
Daughety (1985) uses an infinite regress-model applied to a duopoly to find conditions under
which the Cournot equilibrium becomes consistent.
Another criticism of the Cournot framework lies in the fact that it might lead to counter-
intuitive results when embedded in multi-stage models. In a seminal paper, Allaz & Vila
(1993) model the interaction between two Cournot duopolists who can sign forward contracts
before delivering in the spot market when the demand is revealed in the last stage. There are
N − 1 forward contract stages and one spot market stage. The spot market game is a classic
1With the exception of Egging (2010) where market power can be exerted in the range between the extreme
cases of competitive and Cournot behaviors. However, the level of market power exercise is not endogenous and
is also fixed a priori by the modeler.
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Cournot game where no reaction function is anticipated. In the forward contract stages,
both players know the reaction functions of the competitor in the spot market (because they
observe how the equilibrium shifts), but not in the spot market. At the equilibrium, the
result is quite surprising: the suppliers earn less when there are forward markets and the
consumers’ welfare is better off. Besides, the equilibrium converges toward the perfectly
competitive outcome when the number of forward stages is infinite. In other words, embed-
ding the Cournot paradigm in a multi-stage setting makes the market power disappear. This
conclusion paved the way to a great amount of literature that advocates the use of contracts
to mitigate the effect of market power.
The divisionalization literature is also very useful to study the exports regulation of a
resource producing country. In that vein, we will refer to two important papers dedicated to
the optimal choice of the division of a firm: Baye et al. (1996) and Corchon (1991), because
their setting is close to the economic case we want to study in this paper. In Baye et al.
(1996), a two-stage game is formulated to mimic the incentive of a firm to share its pro-
duction among autonomous units that compete in the second stage as a Cournot oligopoly.
One main finding is that with linear demand and costs, the actors reach the socially optimal
welfare and too many units are chosen. Similarly, Corchon (1991) also solves a two-stage
interaction between groups that can divide their production. Two cases are treated depend-
ing on the shape of the inverse-demand function. The paper drives to the same conclusion,
namely that if the number of groups is high enough, the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibirium
is perfectly competitive. It is worthwhile noting that both Baye et al. (1996) and Corchon
(1991) solve the game in closed loop where the second stage is solved first and its output is
plugged into the first stage problem.
In our paper, we start by constructing a set of classical game theoretical models that
differ in their representation of strategic interaction between the countries. We model a two-
stage oligopoly a la Cournot providing a homogeneous good to a market where the price is
set via an inverse-demand function and the production cost is quadratic. The players decide
endogenously the level of competition they exert in the market. To do so, we assume that
two big entities (we will consider them as countries) have many exporting firms and each
country chooses in the first stage the number of firms it owns that can sell in the market.
The market is solved in the second stage by analyzing the interaction between the firms that
have been allowed to sell. These are in an imperfect competition and we will assume that
they can all exert market power a la Cournot. Each firm allowed to sell will therefore be in
competition with the other firms active in the market, whether they belong to its country
or to the other one. This setting will be referred to as the standard model. Like Baye et
al. (1996) and Corchon (1991), the standard model is solved using backward induction in
closed loop: we first solve the market interaction between the firms allowed to sell in second
stage (assuming that the countries have already chosen the firms to enter the market) and
then, given this outcome, the Nash equilibrium of the game between the countries is calcu-
lated in first stage. Our main finding is that this setting leads to the prisoner’s dilemma
outcome: the Nash equilibrium is not Pareto-optimal and occurs when the countries have
a competitive exporting behavior. In other words, if the countries were to choose the level
of competition they want to exert the market, the equilibrium is reached when all the firms
are allowed to enter. This finding is not new and is similar to what Baye et al. (1996) and
Corchon (1991) have shown, but extended to the convex cost function case (both Baye et al.
(1996) and Corchon (1991) consider a constant marginal production cost). We argue that
this seemingly counter-intuitive result is due to the inconsistency of conjectural variations
of the Nash equilibrium in the game between the countries. To challenge this explanation,
we have extended our setting to three benchmarks for the interaction between the countries.
The first is the situation, where the countries coordinate the number of firms in the market
to optimize their payoff. This is not a classical cartel solution since the firms still compete
with each other and there is no transfer between countries. The second situation models the
same interaction between the countries as the standard model but the game is solved in open
loop: the countries decide at the same time the number of firms to enter the market and
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how these should operate. The last benchmark represents a Stackelberg interaction, when
one country plays before the other and anticipates its reaction function (bi-level game). Our
results suggest that in the coordination between the countries and Stackelberg cases (which
are consistent conjectural variations approaches), the counter-intuitive effect disappears: the
market becomes very concentrated and market power is fully exerted by the countries. The
open loop model gives more subtle results: the market is not concentrated but market power
is still exerted by the countries. In summary, it turns out that the closed loop setting leads
to the most competitive outcome among the different approaches to model a competitive
environment where players choose their level of competition. Both closed and open loops
representations lead to extreme market structures that are not observed in practice. The
Stackelberg outcome is more realistic but contradicts the basic set up of symmetric players.
Indeed by choosing a leader and a follower, the game is clearly not symmetric anymore.
As a final step we expand our setting to a new game theoretical design by giving the
countries the additional possibility to choose if they want to be leader or follower and hence
re-introduce symmetry. We find a mixed strategy equilibrium between the countries where
the number of exporters will be very small and market power quite important, with a very
high probability.
The remaining of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents our standard
model and the three benchmark cases with their main assumptions. The optimization pro-
grams of the countries are detailed and a particular attention is paid to the way the choice of
the level of competition (i.e. the number of firms allowed to enter the market) by the coun-
tries is endogenized. Section 3 gives the main theoretical properties of the models and shows
that there exists a unique solution to each one of them, which is calculated and presented
for an illustrative example. Section 3 also analyzes the results and discusses the economic
implications of the study. We show in particular that the market becomes very concentrated
(and market power is effectively exerted) when the equilibrium holds consistent conjectural
variations. In section 4 we amend the game by allowing countries to choose to be leader or
follower and calculate the mixed strategy equilibrium. Finally, the last section concludes the
paper and presents possible extensions for future work. Proofs are in the appendix.
2 The models
2.1 Assumptions and notation
Our basic setting is as follows: we restrict ourselves to the case of two countries, Country 1
and Country 2, that choose the number of firms which can export to the market. The coun-
tries will also be referred to as players or agents throughout the paper. We will assume that
all the firms are symmetric and face the same cost structure. The marginal production cost
is assumed to be linear and the cost function is denoted by x −→ c1x+c2x2. This functional
form of the cost accommodates the particular case of constant marginal cost, when c2 = 0.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the firms do not face production or transport
capacity constraints. The consumers are represented by their inverse-demand function: if p
is the market price and q the consumption, then p = a− b.q, with a ≥ 0 and b ≥ 0. In other
words, we assume in our model that the consumers are passive and price takers.
We will assume that Country 1 (respectively Country 2) has N ≥ 1 (respectively M ≥ 1)
producing firms on its territory. Hence, Country 1 has to decide the subset I ⊂ {1, 2...N}
of its firms allowed to export (same for Country 2 and J ⊂ {1, 2...M}). All the firms that
have a right to sell in the market are assumed to be in an imperfect competition and act as
a Cournot oligopoly.
To simplify the description, our models are static and we will study the market’s outcome
for one period. Nevertheless, our setting can easily be generalized to a dynamic interaction
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as long as no investment decisions are considered and no cross-temporal links represented.
We assume that a country taxes in an uniform way all its exporting firms by taking a fixed
percentage of their net profit. Therefore, a country maximizes its income when it maximizes
the sum of the profits of all its firms. For the sake of simplicity, we will consider that the
objective function of a country is equal to the sum of the profits of its exporting firms. The
optimal choice of a country depends on what the other country decides, regarding the subset
of its firms allowed to export (and how these behave in the market).
Variables xi, (i ∈ I) are the volumes of the firms belonging to Country 1 allowed to
export. yj , (j ∈ J) are the volumes of the firms belonging to Country 2 allowed to export.
The price in the market is therefore:
p = a− b
∑
i∈I
xi +
∑
j∈J
yj
 (1)
Country 1’s payoff is
Π1(I, J) = p
∑
i∈I
xi − c1
∑
i∈I
xi − c2
∑
i∈I
x2i (2)
Country 2’s payoff is
Π2(I, J) = p
∑
j∈J
yj − c1
∑
j∈J
yj − c2
∑
j∈J
y2j (3)
The fact the Π1 depends on the two subsets I and J is due to equation (1). It indicates that
Country 1’s profit depends on its choices, but also on the choice of Country 2. The same
observation holds for Country 2.
It is important to highlight that we assume the firms to be in competition, even if they
belong to the same country. In other words, no collusion is possible between the firms.
Indeed, if this was the case, the economic theory tells us that to optimize its utility, each
country should act as one player in the market and redistribute its profit between its firms2.
2.2 The closed loop formulation
We present now our reference case where the model is solved using backward induction: first,
we assume that the sets I and J have been chosen by the countries and solve the interaction
between the firms accordingly. This allows to calculate the payoffs of both countries (which
depend on I and J) that are optimized subsequently.
2.2.1 The market model
First, we assume that the sets I and J have been chosen by the countries and let us write
the market equilibrium problem between the firms.
Each firm belonging to I solves the following:
∀i ∈ I, Max
(
a− b
(∑
i∈I xi +
∑
j∈J yj
))
xi − c1xi − c2x2i
st xi ≥ 0
(4)
Each firm belonging to J solves the following:
∀j ∈ J, Max
(
a− b
(∑
i∈I xi +
∑
j∈J yj
))
yj − c1yj − c2y2j
st yj ≥ 0
(5)
Following the Cournot paradigm, we assume here that each firm believes that the op-
ponents will not deviate from the equilibrium when it optimizes its payoff. In other words,
2However, if the firms are not symmetric, it is not straightforward that the kernel of the game is non-empty.
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each firm assumes that the other firms’ output remain constant (which implies that the con-
jectures are not consistent, see Bresnahan (1981) for more details).
The market model (programs (4) and (5)) can be solved easily. The objective function of
each firm is quadratic with respect to its decision variable and standard constraints qualifi-
cation obviously hold. This implies that the first order conditions (or KKT conditions) are
sufficient and necessary to characterize optimality. Hence, the market model can be solved
as a complementarity problem: the KKT conditions of all the optimization programs are
written and solved simultaneously, which gives the following problem:
∀i ∈ I, 0 ≤ xi ⊥ a− c1 − b
∑
i∈I
xi +
∑
j∈J
yj
− 2cxi − bxi ≤ 0 (6a)
∀j ∈ J, 0 ≤ yj ⊥ a− c1 − b
∑
i∈I
xi +
∑
j∈J
yj
− 2cyj − byj ≤ 0 (6b)
It is easy to demonstrate that problem (6a) and (6b) has a unique solution3. In our case,
the solution can be found using a symmetry argument. Since the firms are symmetric, at
the equilibrium their output is the same: if n is the number of elements of I and m of J ,
then (the ∗ denotes the equilibrium):
∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J, x∗i = y∗j =
a− c1
b
.
1
(m+ n+ 1 + 2c2b )
(7)
We deduce that at the equilibrium, the solution depends only on parameters a, b, c1, c2 and
the number of firms n and m. Hence, we will index the solution by m and n (instead of I
and J): xn,mi and y
n,m
j .
The total quantity consumed is:
Qn,m = (m+ n)
(a− c1)
b
1
(m+ n+ 1 + 2c2b )
(8)
and the market price is:
pn,m =
a
(
1 + 2c2b
)
+ (m+ n)c1
(m+ n+ 1 + 2c2b )
(9)
We also calculate the countries’ profits as follows:
Π1(I, J) = Π
m
1 (n) =
n
(m+ n+ 1 + 2c2b )
2
(a− c1)2
(
1 + c2b
)
b
(10)
Π2(I, J) = Π
n
2 (m) =
m
(m+ n+ 1 + 2c2b )
2
(a− c1)2
(
1 + c2b
)
b
(11)
2.2.2 The optimization program of the countries
The novelty of this work is that an imperfect competition between the countries is added
on top of the Cournot interaction of the firms. Each country anticipates the outcome of the
market and knows how it depends on its decision, namely the number of firms it allows to
enter the market. By choosing m and n, each country can decide the level of competition
it wants to have in the market and optimizes its payoff accordingly. Therefore, the market
equilibrium will be embedded in the joint optimization programs of the countries. This ends
up to a double-layer market structure.
3See for example Harker & Pang (1990) for an in-depth analysis of complementarity problems and the ways
to solve them.
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Country 1 maximizes its payoff by tuning the number of its exporting firms n.
Country 1 Max Πm1 (n)
st n ∈ {1, 2...N} (12)
Country 2 maximizes its payoff by tuning the number of its exporting firms m.
Country 2 Max Πn2 (m)
st m ∈ {1, 2...M} (13)
Both programs (12) and (13) are non-convex integer optimization programs. Unlike
what has been done previously for the firms’ interaction, the countries’ competition cannot
be formulated in its complementarity form due to the presence of integer variables. However,
the double structure we obtain can be treated by the standard non-cooperative game theory
framework. The aim now is to calculate the Nash equilibrium of our problem (if it exists)
and study the impact of this double layer competition on the market. A particular attention
will be paid to the market concentration.
One can summarize the game between the countries by the bi-matrix shown in Figure 1.
Country 1 (Country 2)’s strategy set is {1, 2...N} ({1, 2...M}). The columns (rows) represent
the possible choices of Country 1 (Country 2).
Country 1
C
o
u
n
try
 2
n=1 n=2 n=N
m=1
m=2
Π1(1,1)
Π2(1,1)
Π1(2,1)
Π2(2,1)
Π1(N,1)
Π2(N,1)
…
…
Π1(1,2) Π1(2,2) Π1(N,2)
C
o
u
n
try
 2
m=M
…
…
… … …
Π2(1,2) Π2(2,2) Π2(N,2)
Π1(1,M)
Π2(1,M)
Π1(2,M)
Π2(2,M)
Π1(N,M)
Π2(N,M)
Figure 1:
The payoff bi-matrix
Next we introduce three benchmarks for the interactions between the countries: 1) the
coordinated situation where the countries agree jointly on a number of firms, 2) the open
loop game where the decisions about the number of firms and the production levels are
taken at the same time and 3) the Stackelberg situation with one country playing first and
anticipating the reaction of the other country.
2.3 The coordinated situation
In this setting, it is assumed that the countries collude. This means that they cooperate in
setting the number of firms to optimize their common profit Π = Πm1 (n) + Πn1 (m). But the
firms continue to compete. This ends up to solving:
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Max Π = Πm1 (n) + Πn2 (m) =
(a−c1)2
b
(
1 + c2b
)
m+n
(m+n+1+ 2c2b )
2
st n ∈ {1, 2...N},m ∈ {1, 2...M}
(14)
When the countries collude there is a cooperative game between them. The standard
framework to treat collusion effects is the cooperative game theory that allows one to un-
derstand whether the outcome of the cartel is stable inasmuch as the parties agree on a
satisfying sharing rule that prevents each of them from leaving the cartel. However, in this
paper, we restrict ourselves to calculating the optimal payoff and the corresponding market
concentration without studying the stability of the cartel.
The cartel program (45) is a non-convex integer optimization program. We will see in
Section 3 that it has a unique solution.
2.4 The open loop formulation
In the open loop formulation, the countries decide at the same time the subset of firms to
enter the market, I and J , and how these behave in the market xi and yj . Open loop games
are used when players cannot observe the choices of the other agents hence in our setting
countries do not know how many firms the other country would grant an export permission.
Country 1 maximizes its payoff by tuning at the same time the number of its exporting firms
I and their operational variables xi, i ∈ I.
Country 1 Max
(
a− b
(∑
i∈I xi +
∑
j∈J yj
))∑
i∈I xi − c1
∑
i∈I xi − c2
∑
i∈I x
2
i
st I ⊂ {1, 2...N}
∀i ∈ I, xi ≥ 0
(15)
Country 2 maximizes its payoff by tuning at the same time the number of its exporting firms
J and their operational variables yj , j ∈ J .
Country 2 Max
(
a− b
(∑
i∈I xi +
∑
j∈J yj
))∑
j∈J yj − c1
∑
j∈J yj − c2
∑
j∈J y
2
j
st J ⊂ {1, 2...M}
∀j ∈ J, yj ≥ 0
(16)
Both programs (15) and (16) are non-convex mixed integer optimization programs. Here
again, they cannot be solved using the complementarity formulation.
2.5 The Stackelberg setting
Now we extend our setup to an imperfect competition where one leader, say Country 1, plays
before the other. The leader anticipates the reaction of Country 2, the follower, and takes it
into consideration in its optimization. In other words, the conjecture of the leader about the
decision of the follower is consistent. The optimization programs of the countries are given
below. First we start with the follower (backward induction):
Country 2 maximizes its payoff by tuning the number of its exporting firms m, given n.
Country 2 Max Πn2 (m)
st m ∈ {1, 2...M} (17)
If we assume that Problem (17) has a unique solution (which will be shown in 1 in the
following section), we can calculate the reaction function of Country 2: given n, Country 2
should allow m = m∗(n) firms to enter the market in order to maximize its profit.
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Country 1 anticipates the reaction of the follower, which means that it can consider that
m = m∗(n) in its optimization program:
Country 1 Max Πs1 = Π
m∗(n)
1 (n) =
n
(m∗(n) + n+ 1 + 2c2b )
2
(a− c1)2
(
1 + c2b
)
b
st n ∈ {1, 2...N}
(18)
Both the close and open loop models do not provide consistent conjectural variations
equilibria, since each player believes that the decisions of the other player are do not react
to his own decision, which is obviously not true. On the contrary, the cartel and Stackelberg
settings are consistent. This is straightforward for the cartel case since there is no game
between the countries and only one optimization program is solved for both players. The
Stackelberg case is (partially) consistent because the reaction function of one player (the
follower) is correctly and exactly anticipated by the other player (the leader). We refer
to Julien, Musy & Saidi (2011) and Figuières et al. (2004) for an overview of consistent
conjectural equilibria and a demonstration of the conjectural consistency of the Stackelberg
model.
3 Solving the models and economic considerations
In this section, we focus on the resolution of our models. We establish an order of the degree
of market power in the different settings and provide an illustration.
3.1 The closed loop formulation
First, we demonstrate that each player faces an optimization program that gives a unique
solution, considering that the other player’s decision is constant. To simplify the calcula-
tions, we will assume that 2c2b ∈ N. All proofs are reported in Appendix 1.
Theorem 1. Whenm is fixed, program (12) has a unique solution n∗(m) = min
(
m+ 1 + 2c2b , N
)
.
When n is fixed, program (13) has a unique solution m∗(n) = min
(
n+ 1 + 2c2b ,M
)
.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of Country’s 1 payoff Πm1 with respect to n for a fixed m. The
optimal payoff is
Πm1 (n
∗(m)) =
(a− c1)2
4b
(
1 +
c2
b
) 1
m+ 1 + 2c2b
The fact that each country faces an optimization program that has a unique solution
(considering that the other country does not deviate) does not necessarily imply that there
exists a Nash equilibrium to our problem. We recall that a Nash equilibrium is a game sit-
uation where each Country has reached an optimum, provided that the other country does
not deviate.
As stated before, the equilibrium is usually calculated by solving the KKT conditions
of the players simultaneously in a complementarity framework. Existence and uniqueness
results can be drawn using the VI (Variational Inequality) formulation of the problem (see
Facchinei & Pang (2003) for instance for a clear explanation on the use of the VI formulation
to solve equilibrium problems). However, this cannot be done in our case since the players’
optimization programs are not convex (in their objectives) and contain integer variables.
However, we demonstrate in this subsection that our model has a unique equilibrium.
If it exists, the equilibrium has the interesting property to be extremal. Let us first define
the concept of extremal point:
Definition 1. We call an extremal point of the game a couple of strategies (n,m) ∈ {1, 2...N}×
{1, 2...M} such that n = N or m = M .
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Figure 2:
Evolution of Country 1’s payoff with respect to its decision n
As shown in figure 3, an extremal point makes the market “competitive” because at least one
country allows all its firms to sell in the market, which reduces the price.
Theorem 2. If it exists, the equilibrium is an extremal point.
We state now our existence and uniqueness result.
Theorem 3. Our problem (12) and (13) has a unique (closed loop) Nash equilibrium.
As an example, if the countries are symmetric (N = M), then the closed loop Nash equilib-
rium is (ncl,mcl) = (N,M), which makes the market the least concentrated.
Our model leads to a surprising result: a strategic interaction between the countries leads to a
competitive outcome. If the countries are given the choice of firms they allow to export, then
the equilibrium is reached when at least one of the countries authorizes all its firms to sell.
Under a mild condition (see theorem 4) the closed loop Nash equilibrium also maximizes the
social welfare. Given that in economic theory, pure and perfect competition maximizes the
social welfare, the imperfect competition between the countries leads to a quasi-competitive
outcome. Among all the possible strategies, the countries will select the one that maximizes
the social welfare (however, this outcome is called quasi-competitive because the firms exert
market power and as a consequence, the price will still be higher than the marginal supply
cost) and the closed loop Nash equilibrium is the closest outcome to the pure and perfect
competition. This result still holds in the case of constant marginal cost c2 = 0.
The link between the closed loop Nash equilibrium and the optimality of the welfare is de-
tailed in the coming theorem. For the sake of simplicity, we will assume that the countries
are symmetric enough, in the sense that their numbers of potential exporting firms are not
very different:
|N −M | ≤ 1 + 2c2
b
(19)
Theorem 4. If the countries are symmetric enough (assumption (19)), the closed loop Nash
equilibrium maximizes the social welfare.
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Figure 3:
Extremal strategies
Note that the previous result is an unexpected benefit of the (double) imperfect compe-
tition between the actors. Indeed, the countries strive to maximize their respective payoffs
separately and do not consider at all the consumer’s surplus in their decisions.
Given the closed loop equilibrium, we can easily calculate the offered volume to the
consumers:
Q(closed loop) = (ncl +mcl)
(a− c1)
b
1
ncl +mcl + 1 +
2c2
b
(20)
This volume will be further discussed in Section 3.5, where we will compare between the
different volumes obtained by our settings in order to quantify the degree of market power
exercise.
To sum up, at first sight, we are facing a counter-intuitive result (that will be referred to
as the closed loop Nash Cournot paradox). In the closed loop system, when the countries are
left the possibility to choose the level of competition in the market, they will nonetheless go
for the most competitive market structure that generates the lowest price. As pointed out
above, this finding also applies when the marginal cost is constant: the competitiveness of
the market is not due to the fact that a quadratic cost function makes the total production
cost lower when the production is split among different firms. Both Baye et al. (1996) and
Corchon (1991) arrived to the same conclusion in the constant marginal cost case in closed
loop. We believe that this is due to the conjectural inconsistency of the closed loop Nash
equilibrium: each country assumes that the reaction function of the opponent is constant,
which is not true. However, as pointed out in Makowski (1987) and Lindh (1992), it is eco-
nomically hard for a player to have a consistent conjecture about the opponent, since this
requires him to know its cost structure and market behavior. We will see later on that if we
nevertheless assume that a player anticipates the reaction of the other one in its economic
calculation, the market becomes concentrated, market power becomes important and the
counter-intuitive effect disappears.
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3.2 The coordinated solution
Obviously, the closed loop result is at the opposite of what one expects from a coordinated
behavior. If the countries are to collude, the economic theory suggests that they would reduce
the number of actors in the market in order to increase prices and fully exploit market power.
This can be replicated by our model thanks to the following theorem:
Theorem 5. Under the assumption 2c2b ≤ 1, if the countries collude, the outcome is
(nc,mc) = (1, 1): each country leaves only one firm to export and the market becomes a
duopoly. This outcome is Pareto-optimal for the game between the countries.
As stated before, we do not discuss here the existence of a stable sharing rule of the total
payoff between the countries. However, since all the firms are symmetric, it is easy to demon-
strate that if the countries were to collude, the kernel of the cooperative game is non-empty
and the cartel is stable (see for example Tijs & Driessen (1986) for a better understanding
of cost allocation problems in game theory).
Note that assuming that 2c2b ≤ 1 is not restrictive and means that when the market is com-
petitive, the intercept of the inverse demand curve a is superior than the production marginal
cost plus the market price.
The equilibrium reached by the countries when they compete imperfectly in closed loop
is much more competitive than the collusive outcome and is not Pareto-optimal (see for
instance Pardalos, Migdalas & Pitsoulis (2008) for a formalization of Pareto-optimality in
game theoretical models). This result is not new and is exactly the prisoner’s dilemma issue.
A particular country, say Country 1, knows that reducing the number of firms increases the
price and the joint payoff. However, it also knows that if the opponent (Country 2) does
reduce the number of its firms, a free-riding opportunity emerges since by increasing the
number of Country 1’s own firms, the volume increase effect will increase unilaterally its
payoff and consequently decrease Country 2’s one. Therefore, the closed loop Nash equilib-
rium cannot be Pareto-optimal.
Given the cartel outcome (nc,mc) = (1, 1), we can easily calculate the offered volume to
the consumers in this situation:
Q(cartel) =
2(a− c1)
b
1
3 + 2c2b
(21)
3.3 The open loop equilibrium
In the open loop case, the countries optimize the number of firms as well as their production
at the same time.
Theorem 6. The open loop Nash equilibrium of the game given in (15) and (16) leads to
the following outcome: nol = N , mol = M .
The corresponding consumption in the open loop game between the countries is calculated
in Appendix 1:
Q(open loop) =
2(a− c1)
3b
(
MN + c2b (M +N)
)(
MN + 43
c2
b (M +N) +
4
3
c22
b2
) (22)
The open loop leads to an un-concentrated market: nol = N , mol = M . However, market
power still remains important in the market. The total quantity consumed is similar to the
one in the coordinated case but differs only by a term linked to the marginal cost (If we set
c2 = 0 then the quantities are the same). We will discuss this further in Section 3.5.
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3.4 The Stackelberg equilibrium
The Stackelberg model is solved by backward induction. First we start with the follower:
Country 2 maximizes its payoff by setting the number of its exporting firms m, given the
choice of the country 1 n.
Country 2 Max Πn2 (m)
st m ∈ {1, 2...M} (23)
Problem (23) has already been studied in Section 2 and using Theorem 1, one can already
deduce that the optimum is reached for
m = m∗(n) = min
(
n+ 1 +
2c2
b
,M
)
The leader considers that m = m∗(n) in his optimization program:
Country 1 Max Πs1 = Π
m∗(n)
1 (n) =
n
(m∗(n) + n+ 1 + 2c2b )
2
(a− c1)2
(
1 + c2b
)
b
st n ∈ {1, 2...N}
(24)
To simplify the analysis, we will assume that the countries have the same number of firms:
N = M . We will also make the previous assumption 2c2b ≤ 1. We will show that when
the imperfect competition is of the Stackelberg form, the outcome is no more competitive.
Figure 4 shows the evolution of the leader (Country 1)’s objective function with respect to
n.
Figure 4:
The leader’s objective function in the Stackelberg setting
The leader’s profit function is not convex and might have multiple local optima. However,
the following theorem provides a simple assumption on N (added to the assumptions N = M
and 2c2b ≤ 1) that ensures existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.
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Theorem 7. If M = N ≥ 5 and 2c2b ≤ 1, the Stackelberg game given in (23) and (24) leads
to the following outcome: ns = 1 + 2c2b , ms = 2.(1 +
2c2
b ) = 2ns
Theorem 7 shows that in a Stackelberg (bi-level) game, if the countries are allowed to
choose the level of competition they want in the market to optimize the payoff, the outcome
is much less competitive that the closed loop Nash equilibria, but more competitive that the
coordinated situation. Note that the leader is less competitive than the follower who leaves
more firms to enter the market, which suggests that the leader exerts more market power
than the follower.
The corresponding consumption in the Stackelberg case is given as follows:
Q(Stackelberg) = (ns +ms)
(a− c1)
b
1
ns +ms + 1 +
2c2
b
(25)
3.5 Economic discussion and a numerical illustration
3.5.1 Economic implications
In order to analyze the degree of market power exercise, we compare the resulting consump-
tion of each model, since less consumption means higher prices and more market power
exercise. To benchmark our results, we also report the consumption of a monopoly in the
market Q(monopoly) = (a−c1)2(b+c2) , which corresponds to least competitive market situation.
The comparison between the different levels of consumption is given in the following theo-
rem:
Theorem 8. Under our standard assumptions 2c2b ≤ 1 and M = N ≥ 5, we have:
Q(monopoly) ≤ Q(cartel) ≤ Q(open loop) ≤ Q(Stackelberg) ≤ Q(closed loop) (26)
The demonstration of Theorem 8 is straightforward, given relations (20), (21), (22) and
(25).
It comes with no surprise that the monopoly situation guaranties the highest upstream
payoff and exacerbates market power. In term of market power effect, the cartel outcome
comes next and differs from the monopoly by only one feature inherent to our representation:
even if the countries collude, each one of them must let at least one of its firm enter the mar-
ket: n ≥ 1 and m ≥ 1 (in other words, the coordinated solution imposes that both countries
should be represented in the market). As a consequence, the cartel solution is equivalent to
a Cournot duopoly with a high market concentration.
The closed loop Nash equilibrium is the most competitive and the least concentrated out-
come. Furthermore, it is straightforward to notice from equation (20) that the theoretical
pure and perfect competition (with quadratic cost) occurs if the number of firms N + M
goes toward infinity. This result is very similar to the Allaz & Vila (1993) finding, but the
underlying economic reasons are completely different. In Allaz & Vila (1993), the duopolists
interact on a conceptually infinite number of stages and see the reaction function of the op-
ponent only in the spot market. In our setting, we stick to the Nash Cournot paradigm since
no reaction function is anticipated. Our result is only driven by the free riding opportunity
that occur when the agents play simultaneously: each player would prefer increasing his
sales by allowing a little more firms to enter the market. Finally, one will conclude that the
two-stage closed loop Nash Cournot model is equivalent to the Bertrand competition that
leads to the same paradox: a lack of market power at the equilibrium.
The most surprising result maybe lies in the comparison between the closed and open
loop cases. In open loop, the players are myopic inasmuch as they do not know the mar-
ket outcome before selecting the firms. However, at the equilibrium, market power effect is
stronger than in closed loop where agents are supposed to be more “clever”. Both our closed
loop interaction and the Allaz & Vila (1993) model share a lack of behavioral consistency: in
Allaz & Vila (1993), the players see the reaction function of the opponent’s contract decisions
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only in the spot market and besides, when the spot market is revealed, a classical Cournot
game with no anticipation occurs. In our closed loop Nash equilibrium, none of the players
see the reaction function of the opponent in the market.
The Stackelberg model is more consistent: the leader sees the reaction function of the
follower and takes it into consideration in his profit maximization. Thus, at the equilibrium,
the conjecture of the leader about the decision of the follower is consistent (this is obviously
not true for the follower). We notice that the Stackelberg solution makes the market (much)
more concentrated than the closed loop Nash equilibrium and the effect of market power
is stronger. This last result suggests that the inconsistency of the Nash Cournot paradigm
explains the paradox: when left with the possibility to exert market power, a Cournot player
might prefer to be competitive.
As seen in the introduction, the Cournot paradigm has been very successful in analyzing
concentrated markets in many sectors (energy, airlines, water, etc). It describes correctly a
basic withholding strategy to increase prices and mimics the imperfection of the competition.
However, the modeler should be cautious when it comes to analyzing the impact of market
power on the profits of the agents, as these might not be consistent anymore with the
assumption of market power exercise itself.
3.5.2 Illustration
To illustrate our finding, consider a situation where each country can split its exporting
activity into five firms: N = M = 5. We give arbitrary values to the demand parameters:
a = 10 and b = 1. The cost structure is such that c1 = 0 and c2 = 0.1. The following array
summarizes the results in terms of market power exercise and market concentration.
symbol Monopoly Cartel Open loop Stackelberg Closed loop
Market concentration n+m 1 2 10 3 10
Total supply Q 4.5 6.2 6.5 7.1 8.9
Price p 5.5 3.8 3.5 2.9 1.1
As a indicator for the degree of market power exercise we report the level of supply brought
to the market. Not surprisingly, our numerical results are in line with Theorem 8.
As stated above, the monopoly case is the least competitive. Besides, the cartel exploits
market power at nearly its maximum: the level of supply is exactly the one offered by the
duopoly and the market is also very concentrated (n+m = 2). The closed lop Nash equilib-
rium is, as was noticed before, the outcome where market power is the least exploited and the
market is the most concentrated (n+m = 10). The open loop Nash equilibrium has a strong
market power exercise (very close to the cartel one). This result is quite intuitive because in
open loop, the countries also operate the firms and hence will eventually end up acting as a
duopoly. The fact that the market is not concentrated in open loop (n + m = 10) despite
the strong market power exercise is simply due to the strictly convex cost structure: given a
volume to be supplied, it is less costly to share it among many firms than make it produced
by one firm. The Stackelberg outcome allows the countries to better exploit market power
and the market is also relatively concentrated (n+m = 3).
3.5.3 The Stackelberg solution and symmetry of the game
In the Stackelberg game presented in Section 2.5, we had to assume that one country plays
before the other. Hence the Stackelberg discussion is not in line with the assumption of
symmetry of the players that is used in the rest of the paper since one player, even with
the same cost functions, is a leader. Furthermore, using equations (10) and (11), one can
calculate the profits at the Stackelberg equilibrium:
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Πs1 =
ns
(ms + ns + 1 +
2c2
b )
2
(a− c1)2
(
1 + c2b
)
b
(27)
Πs2 =
ms
(ms + ns + 1 +
2c2
b )
2
(a− c1)2
(
1 + c2b
)
b
(28)
and since using Theorem 7, we know that ms = 2ns, and we can deduce that:
Πs2 = 2Π
s
1 (29)
In other words, the follower earns twice more than the leader, which is due to the free-riding
opportunity offered by the game. Having this knowledge, one should wonder whether one
country would take the risk to lead the game: its sole benefit would be to avoid the closed
loop Nash equilibrium paradox and create the possibility to exert market power, but at the
expense of earning less than the follower. Furthermore, if both countries have the same
number of firms (N = M), there is no economic justification to consider that a country plays
before the other since they are assumed to have symmetric firms. Therefore, the Stackelberg
outcome is not consistent with the symmetry and hence not likely to occur. Then, one
might wonder how market power exercise can appear if the countries do not collude. We will
attempt to shed some light on this question in the following section.
4 The leader-follower game between the countries
In this section we attempt to reconcile the insights we got from the Stackelberg game with
the basic set-up of symmetric players. We do this by extending the game by one additional
choice for the players. Each player has the possibility to choose whether he wants to be
(act as) leader or follower in the game. The players choose simultaneously and the choice is
discrete. Hence we might find two leaders or two followers meaning that both players might
act as if they were to be leaders or followers.
The players’ profits are given in equations (10) and (11) and each country has two possible
choices: act as a leader or as a follower. The set of joint strategies is therefore (subscripts
refer to the players):
S = {(leader1, leader2), (leader1, follower2), (follower1, leader2), (follower1, follower2)}
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the firms face a constant marginal cost, c2 = 0,
and that both countries have the same number of firms N = M . Therefore, the game is
perfectly symmetric.
The (leader1, follower2) and (follower2, leader1) strategies are typical Stackelberg situations
where one country leads and the other follows. Their outcome has already been solved in
Theorem 7 and is summarized as follows:
(leader1, follower2) =⇒ (n,m) = (1, 2), (Π1,Π2) = (a− c1)
2
b
(
1
16
,
1
8
)
(30)
(follower1, leader2) =⇒ (n,m) = (2, 1), (Π1,Π2) = (a− c1)
2
b
(
1
8
,
1
16
)
(31)
When both players are followers, they cannot anticipate the reaction function of the oppo-
nent, which implies that the outcome is exactly the closed loop Nash equilibrium calculated
in Section 3.1 :
(follower1, follower2) =⇒ (n,m) = (N,N), (Π1,Π2) = (a− c1)
2
b
(
N
(2N + 1)2
,
N
(2N + 1)2
)
(32)
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We focus now on the (leader1, leader2) situation. When both players are leaders, they jointly
anticipate the reaction function of the opponent. If we write n(m) and m(n) the reaction
functions of the first and second country respectively, we will have to solve the following
game:
Country 1 Max Πm(n)1 (n) =
n
(m(n) + n+ 1)2
(a− c1)2
b
st n ∈ {1, 2...N}
(33)
Country 2 Max Πn(m)2 (m) =
m
(n(m) +m+ 1)2
(a− c1)2
b
st m ∈ {1, 2...N}
(34)
When writing the optimization programs of the countries (33) and (34), we have assumed
that when maximizing its payoff, each country anticipates the reaction function of the rival
firm. At the equilibrium, the solution is given in the following theorem:
Theorem 9. When c2 = 0 and both countries are leaders, the equilibrium is reached when
n = 1 and m = 1.
Theorem 9 implies that when both players lead in the market, they eventually end up acting
as a cartel: they both concentrate at maximum the market and allow one firm to sell. It is
straightforward to calculate the corresponding payoffs at the equilibrium:
(leader1, leader2) =⇒ (n,m) = (1, 1), (Π1,Π2) = (a− c1)
2
b
(
1
9
,
1
9
)
(35)
To sum-up, the leader-follower game between the countries can be sumarized in the standard
bi-matrix of figure 5.
Country 1
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 2
follower2
Figure 5:
Summary of the leader-follower game between the countries
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This game has two Nash equilibria in pure strategies: (leader1,follower2) and (follower1,leader2)
that have already been dismissed using a symmetry argument. To seek a symmetric outcome,
let us solve it in mixed strategy: the first (second) player looks for the probability θ1 (θ2
respectively) to act a leader and 1 − θ1 (1 − θ2 respectively) to act as a follower so that its
expected profit is maximal, given the choice of the opponent. The decisions of the players
are taken independently.
Theorem 10. The leader-follower game has a unique symmetric solution:
θ1 = θ2 = θ0 =
1
16 − N(2N+1)2
11
144 − N(2N+1)2
(36)
The following table summarizes the issue of the leader-follower game when there is a huge
number of potential firms (N, M −→∞):
Table 1: Results of the leader-follower game.
(leader1,leader2) (leader1,follower2) (follower1,leader2) (follower1,follower2)
Probability of occurrence (%) 67 15 15 3
Market concentration (m+ n) 2 3 3 ∞
With a 67% probability, both countries act as leaders, the market is the most concentrated
and market power is exerted at its maximum level. On the contrary, the Cournot outcome
is unlikely to happen (3%). Practically, our result suggests that if the countries can choose
the way they behave in the market (leader or follower), market power is expected to be fully
exerted (both countries acting as leaders) with a quite high probability. On the contrary,
the closed loop Nash equilibrium paradox naturally disappears and will rarely be observed
in the market.
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5 Conclusion
The economic literature provides many ways to model imperfect competition. However, the
extent to which market power should be exerted by a player is not treated in the literature,
as the common belief is that if a player has the ability to manipulate prices, he will naturally
do it.
In this exercise, we propose a stylized model to demonstrate that this belief is not always
justified. Two countries strategically compete to choose the number of their firms allowed
to sell in a market. Those firms exert market power. We show that when the countries
play simultaneously and if they are symmetric enough, the closed loop Nash equilibrium is
reached when the market is the most competitive (i.e. all the firms are allowed to enter
the market). We argue that this result, which is similar to the Bertrand paradox, is due to
the conjectural inconsistency of the Nash equilibrium. It is also similar to the Allaz & Vila
(1993) result but is not driven by the same economic rationale. In our case, a free-riding
opportunity emerges in the Nash Cournot solution which makes a player prefer increasing
his sales instead of strongly withholding. The market is the most concentrated when the
countries collude. The Stackelberg case is intermediary between the cartel and the Nash
situations and the paradox disappears in it.
We also demonstrate that when the choice to act as a leader or a followers is given to
the players, the closed loop Nash equilibrium is very unlikely to occur. The most proba-
ble outcome is a full exercise of market power and both countries concentrate the market
at the maximum. All our results hold when the marginal production cost is constant or linear.
Future work could introduce a asymetry between the firms and find the conditions under
which the competitive paradox in closed loop disappears. An interesting complex extension
could model a continuous and endogenous decision of market power exercise by the players.
Taking into account the cartel stability between the countries when studying their possible
collusion is also an interesting development.
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Appendix 1
Proof of Theorem 1
We first prove the lemma for Country 1. m is fixed in N and let us study the function Πm1 (n)
with respect to n. First we assume that n ∈ R+.
Πm1 : R+ −→ R is continuously differentiable with respect to n and:
∀n ∈ R+, ∂Π
m
1
∂n
(n) =
(a− c1)2
b
(1 + c2b )(
m+ n+ 1 + 2c2b
)3 (m+ 1 + 2c2b − n
)
(37)
Therefore, Πm1 is upper bounded and reaches its maximum when n∗(m) = m+1+
2c2
b . Since
2c2
b ∈ N, we can deduce that the optimum is reached on N. In a similar way, we prove that
Πn2 reaches its maximum when m∗(n) = n+ 1 +
2c2
b ∈ N.
Using equation (37), we can demonstrate that ∂Π
m
1
∂n (n) ≥ 0 for n ∈ [0, n∗(m)] and ∂Π
m
1
∂n (n) ≤ 0
for n ∈ [n∗(m),∞). Since n∗(m) ≥ 1, it is easy to see that on {1, 2...N}, if n∗(m) ≤ N ,
Πm1 is optimal when n = n∗(m) and if n∗(m) > N , Πm1 is optimal when n = N . The same
reasoning can be done for Πn2 .
To simplify the notation, we will now call n∗(m) = min
(
1 +m+ 2c2b , N
)
and m∗(n) =
min
(
1 + n+ 2c2b ,M
)
.
Proof of Theorem 2
If it exists, we will denote by (ncl,mcl) the closed loop Nash equilibrium. If we assume that
the equilibrium is not extremal, we would have:
ncl < N (38)
mcl < M (39)
By definition of the equilibrium, Πmcl1 is optimal for ncl, which means that ncl ≥ 1. Since
ncl < N , we would have ncl = 1 + mcl + 2c2b . The reasoning is symmetric for Country 2,
which gives:
ncl = 1 +mcl +
2c2
b
(40)
mcl = 1 + ncl +
2c2
b
(41)
which is absurd. Therefore the equilibrium is extremal.
Proof of Theorem 3
We prove now that there exists a unique closed loop Nash equilibrium. By definition, the
equilibrium is a couple (ncl,mcl) such that ncl = n∗(mcl) and mcl = m∗(ncl).
First we assume its existence (ncl,mcl). Let us study two cases:
• We assume that N > M .
Two sub-cases are to be considered:
1). N > M + 1 + 2c2b .
Since the equilibrium is extremal, we must have either ncl = N ormcl = M . If ncl = N ,
this means, given Theorem 1 that N ≤ mcl + 1 + 2c2b . In that case, if mcl < M , we
would have M > mcl = ncl + 1 + 2c2b = N + 1 +
2c2
b , which is absurd given that
N > M . Hence, mcl = M and this contradicts the fact that N ≤ mcl + 1 + 2c2b .
Therefore ncl < N and since the equilibrium is extremal, we need to have mcl = M .
Then ncl = M + 1 + 2c2b < N . To sum up, we must have (ncl,mcl) = (M + 1 +
2c2
b ,M).
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Finally we easily check that the point obtained (ncl,mcl) = (M + 1 + 2c2b ,M) is indeed
a Nash equilibrium.
2). N ≤M + 1 + 2c2b .
Since the equilibrium is extremal, we must have either ncl = N or mcl = M . If
mcl = M , this means, given Theorem 1 that M ≤ ncl + 1 + 2c2b . In that case, if
ncl < N , we would have N > ncl = mcl + 1 + 2c2b = M + 1 +
2c2
b , which is absurd given
that N ≤M +1+ 2c2b . Hence, ncl = N . To sum up, we must have (ncl,mcl) = (N,M).
Finally we easily check that the point obtained (ncl,mcl) = (N,M) is indeed a Nash
equilibrium.
• We assume that N < M .
By symmetry it is straightforward to demonstrate that the equilibrium is:
1). If M > N + 1 + 2c2b , (ncl,mcl) = (N,N + 1 +
2c2
b ).
2). If M ≤ N + 1 + 2c2b , (ncl,mcl) = (N,M).
• We assume that N = M .
The equilibrium is (ncl,mcl) = (N,M).
Proof of Theorem 4
Under assumption (19), the proof of Theorem 3 indicates that the closed loop Nash equilib-
rium is (ncl,mcl) = (N,M). Let us prove that this outcome maximizes the social welfare.
The social welfare W (n,m) is the sum of the firms’ profits and the consumer’s surplus:
W (n,m) = aQn,m − b
2
(Qn,m)2 − c1
∑
i
xi +
∑
j
yj
− c2
∑
i
x2i +
∑
j
y2j
 (42)
After some algebra, we get:
W (n,m) =
(a− c1)2
b
(
m+ n
m+ n+ 1 + 2c2b
− 1
2
(m+ n)2
(m+ n+ 1 + 2c2b )
2
− c2
b
m+ n
(m+ n+ 1 + 2c2b )
2
)
(43)
W (n,m) depends on the total number of firms m + n. Let us calculate the optimum of
W (n,m) over {1, 2...N} × {1, 2...M}. As done before, we consider W (n,m) as a function of
x = n+m and we first optimize it on R+. After some calculations, we get:
∀x ∈ R+, ∂W
∂x
(x) =
(a− c1)2
b(x+ 1 + 2c2b )
3
(
(1 +
2c2
b
)(1 +
c2
b
) +
c2
b
x
)
≥ 0 (44)
Hence, the social welfare increases with the number of firms, which is quite intuitive since by
increasing the number of firms, we get closer to the pure and perfect competition. Therefore,
we can deduce that the situation (n,m) = (ncl,mcl) = (N,M) optimizes the social welfare
in the game between the countries.
Proof of Theorem 5
In this theorem, it is assumed that the countries collude. This means that they cooperate
to optimize their common profit Π = Πm1 + Πn1 . This ends up to solving:
Max Π = Πm1 + Πn2 =
(a−c1)2
b
(
1 + c2b
)
m+n
(m+n+1+ 2c2b )
2
st n ∈ {1, 2...N},m ∈ {1, 2...M}
(45)
First we study Π as a function of x = m+ n over R+. Π is continuously differentiable and:
24
∀x ∈ R+, ∂Π
∂x
(x) =
(a− c1)2
b
(
1 +
c2
b
) 1 + 2c2b − x(
x+ 1 + 2c2b
)3 (46)
Therefore, the total profit Π decreases on [1+ 2c2b ,+∞[. Since 2c2b ≤ 1, we have 0 ≤ 1+ 2c2b ≤ 2
and we can deduce that the maximization program of the cartel (45) reaches its optimum
when x = m+ n = 2, which implies that m = n = 1.
Since the sum of the countries’ profits has been maximized, we necessarily reach the Pareto-
optimal point of the game between the players.
Proof of Theorem 6
We first concentrate on Country 1’s optimization program in open loop given in (15). The
decisions of the other country J and yj are exogenous.
When I is fixed (I has n elements), the optimality conditions with respect to xi give:
∀i ∈ I, a− c1 − b
∑
j
yj − 2b
∑
i
xi − 2c2xi = 0 (47)
and by summing over i ∈ I, we obtain:
n(a− c1 − b
∑
j
yj)− 2(bn+ c2)
∑
i
xi = 0 (48)
or
∑
i
xi =
n(a− c1 − b
∑
j yj)
2(bn+ c2)
(49)
Plugging (49) in (47), we get:
∀i ∈ I, xi =
a− c1 − b
∑
j yj
2(bn+ c2)
(50)
and we can calculate the optimal profit of Country 1 (given I, J and yj) as follows:
Πol1 (I) = Π
ol
1 (n) =
(a− c1 − b
∑
j yj)
2
4
n
bn+ c2
(51)
Πol1 increases with n and is therefore optimal when n = N . The same reasoning holds for
the other player (Country 2).
The open loop Nash equilibrium is therefore (nol,mol) = (N,M).
If we denote by Q1 (respectively Q2) the total volume brought by the firms belonging to
Country 1 (respectively Country 2) at the equilibrium, equation (49) gives:
Q1 =
N(a− c1 − bQ2)
2(bN + c2)
(52)
and symmetrically, we obtain:
Q2 =
M(a− c1 − bQ1)
2(bM + c2)
(53)
Equations (52) and (53) constitute a system of two equations and variables that can be
solved easily to calculate the total consumption:
Q(open loop) = Q1 +Q2 =
2(a− c1)
3b
MN + c2b (M +N)
MN + 43
c2
b (M +N) +
4
3
c22
b2
(54)
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Proof of Theorem 7
We already know the reaction function of Country 2 (the follower):
m∗(n) = min(n+ 1 +
2c2
b
,M) (55)
Therefore, the profit of Country 1 (the leader) can be explicitly written as follows:
Πs1(n) =
n
4(n+ 1 + 2c2b )
2
(a− c1)2
(
1 + c2b
)
b
if 0 ≤ n ≤M − 1− 2c2
b
(56)
n
(M + n+ 1 + 2c2b )
2
(a− c1)2
(
1 + c2b
)
b
if n ≥M − 1− 2c2
b
(57)
We will denote by κ the constant
(a−c1)2(1+ c2b )
b . It is easy to show that over [0,M −1− 2c2b ],
Πs1 is optimal when n = n1 = 1 +
2c2
b . Over [M − 1− 2c2b ,M + 1 + 2c2b ], Πs1 increases. Since
N ∈ [M−1− 2c2b ,M+1+ 2c2b ] (we recall that N = M), we deduce that over [M−1− 2c2b , N ],
Πs1 is maximal when n = n2 = N .
Now, to optimize Πs1 over {1, 2, ...N} we need to compare between Πs1(n1) and Πs1(n2). We
denote by α = 1 + 2c2b and calculate:
Πs1(n1) =
κ
16α (58)
Πs1(n2) =
κN
(2N+α)2 (59)
After some basic algebra, we deduce that N ≥ ( 32 +
√
2)α =⇒ Πs1(n1) ≥ Πs1(n2). Since it
has been assumed that N ≥ 5 and because α ≤ 2 (which is due to the fact that 2c2b ≤ 1), we
deduce that Πs1(n1) ≥ Πs1(n2) and Country 1 should choose ns = n1 = 1 + 2c2b . Given the
reaction function of the follower, we have ms = ns + 1 + 2c2b = 2ns.
Proof of Theorem 9
Writing the KKT conditions of the optimization program of Country 1 (33), one gets:
m(n) + n+ 1 = 2n
(
1 +
∂m
∂n
)
(60)
or
m(n)− n+ 1 = 2n∂m
∂n
(61)
By doing the same calculation for the optimization program of Country 2 (34), one gets:
n(m)−m+ 1 = 2m ∂n
∂m
(62)
By differentiating relation (61) with respect to variable m and keeping in mind that:
∂2m
∂m∂n
=
∂2m
∂n∂m
=
∂1
∂n
= 0
one obtains the following relation:
1− ∂n
∂m
= 2
∂n
∂m
∂m
∂n
(63)
By differentiating relation (62) with respect to variable n and keeping in mind that:
∂2n
∂n∂m
=
∂2n
∂m∂n
=
∂1
∂m
= 0
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one obtains the following relation:
1− ∂m
∂n
= 2
∂n
∂m
∂m
∂n
(64)
Combining (63) and (64), we get:
∂m
∂n
=
∂n
∂m
(65)
Plugging relation (65) into equation (63), we obtain:
1− ∂n
∂m
= 2
(
∂n
∂m
)2
(66)
In other words, ∂n∂m and
∂m
∂n are solutions to the degree two polynomial equation:
2X2 +X − 1 = 0
that has two solutions: 12 and −1.
• If ∂n∂m = ∂m∂n = −1. Using equations (61) and (62), we have:
m+ n+ 1 = 0 (67)
which is impossible since n ≥ 0 and m ≥ 0.
• If ∂n∂m = ∂m∂n = 12 . Using equations (61) and (62), we deduce that:
m = n = 1 (68)
Proof of Theorem 10
Since the players chose independently to act as a leader of follower, one can calculate the
probability distribution of the profit of the first country:
• (leader1,leader2) leads to a profit Π1 = (a−c1)
2
b
1
9 with a probability θ1θ2.
• (leader1,follower2) leads to a profit Π1 = (a−c1)
2
b
1
16 with a probability θ1(1− θ2).
• (follower1,leader2) leads to a profit Π1 = (a−c1)
2
b
1
8 with a probability (1− θ1)θ2.
• (follower1,follower2) leads to a profit Π1 = (a−c1)
2
b
N
(2N+1)2 with a probability (1 −
θ1)(1− θ2).
Country 1’s expected profit is then:
〈Π1〉 = (a− c1)
2
b
(
θ1θ2
1
9
+ θ1(1− θ2) 1
16
+ (1− θ1)θ2 1
8
+ (1− θ1)(1− θ2) N
(2N + 1)2
)
(69)
In mixed strategies, Country 1 now faces the following optimization program:
Country 1 Max 〈Π1〉
st θ1 ∈ [0, 1] (70)
Constraint θ1 ∈ [0, 1] simply means that θ1 is a probability.
Problem (70) is a linear optimization problem (LP) that can be solved algebraically. If we
denote by
θ0 =
1
16 − N(2N+1)2
11
144 − N(2N+1)2
its solution θ∗1(θ2) is as follows:
θ2 < θ0 =⇒ θ∗1(θ2) = 1
27
θ2 > θ0 =⇒ θ∗1(θ2) = 0
θ2 = θ0 =⇒ θ∗1(θ2) ∈ [0, 1]
Similarly, the previous calculation can be done for the Country 2 and we obtain the following:
θ1 < θ0 =⇒ θ∗2(θ1) = 1
θ1 > θ0 =⇒ θ∗2(θ1) = 0
θ1 = θ0 =⇒ θ∗2(θ1) ∈ [0, 1]
The equilibrium is reached for (θ1, θ2) when θ∗1(θ2) = θ1 and θ∗2(θ1) = θ2. We then have
three solutions:
• θ∗1 = 0 and θ∗2 = 1. Rejected because not symmetric.
• θ∗1 = 1 and θ∗2 = 0. Rejected because not symmetric.
• θ∗1 = θ0 and θ∗2 = θ0. Accepted because symmetric.
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